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Abstract
Privacy-providing tools, including tools that provide anonymity, are
gaining popularity in the modern world. Among the goals of their users
is avoiding tracking and profiling. While some businesses are unhappy
with the growth of privacy-enhancing technologies, others can use lack
of information about their users to avoid unnecessary liability and even
possible harassment by parties with contrary business interests, and to
gain a competitive market edge.
Currently, users interested in anonymous browsing have the choice only
between single-hop proxies and the few more complex systems that are
available. These still leave the user vulnerable to long-term intersection
attacks.
In this paper, we propose a caching proxy system for allowing users
to retrieve data from the World-Wide Web in a way that would provide
recipient unobservability by a third party and sender unobservability by
the recipient and thus dispose with intersection attacks, and report on the
prototype we built using Google.
1 Introduction
Following the most recent political and economic developments, from increased
consumer profiling for many ends and purposes (see, for example, [Ele03]) to
plans of the US Government for Terrorism Information Awareness (formerly To-
tal Information Awareness, see [DAR03]), a number of previously unconcerned
people started to contemplate being more careful with exposing or giving out
any information about themselves. A number of businesses that have been
collecting data about their customers have also taken damage from adversary
parties. It is no longer a purely hypothetic possibility that a vendor of electronic
equipment will find his web logs subpoenaed on murky legal grounds. An ex-
ample is the recent DirecTV case, where customer lists of a number of different
companies that sold smart cards were seized, and people on these lists accused
of piracy [Pou03].
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The lack of privacy of transactions on the web being well-known (as docu-
mented, for example, at [Ele97]), more people are now starting to try services
that claim to provide anonymous browsing on the web, such as anonymizer.com
or the-cloak.com.
Merely doing a Google search provides one with a long list of what seems
like a number of very different services - free or paid, with more or less features
and paranoia, with better or worse performance, with bigger or smaller quotas
- which claim that they would anonymize one’s web browsing. Looking closer,
however, one cannot help noticing that most of them are based on the same
underlying assumptions, the same attacker model and the same design.
The few more complicated systems that consider a more powerful attacker
have yet to go into wide use and require extra software download and setup
from the user (and some of them may also come with extra obligations, such
as automated request-forwarding). Of these, we are aware of only two that are
currently publicly available: Crowds [RR98] and JAP [BFK01]. The first com-
mercial mix-net, Freedom Network [GS01] is now offline permanently [SG00];
Onion Routing [SGR97] is offline temporarily (we hope), waiting for the test of
its second generation system.
This does not leave many options to a user concerned about his privacy,
raising the question: what are the simplest anonymizing systems really giving
a user in search of protection, and is there a way to get better protection than
that?
2 Anonymity and Unobservability
In the terms of [PK00], anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a
set of subjects. Sender anonymity means that the sender of the message cannot
be identified, while recipient anonymity means that the recipient of the message
cannot be identified. Unlinkability of sender and recipient means that it cannot
be identified that a given sender and recipient are communicating with each
other. Even stronger than anonymity, unobservability means that the existence
of the message itself cannot be detected. Sender (or recipient) unobservability
means that it is impossible to detect whether any sender (recipient) from the
set of subjects is sending (receiving), while relationship unobservability means
that it is impossible to detect the existence of a message sent from a possible
sender to a possible recipient.
For this definition to work, one needs to consider also two concepts: that of
the attacker against whom anonymity is achieved and of the degree of anonymity
(as described in [RR98]), the certainty with which the attacker can pinpoint the
sender, the recipient, or link them to each other. The attackers can be passive
- merely watching the traffic, or active - capable of inserting their own traffic.
They can be local, watching only one node or wire, or global, watching multiple
nodes or wires. They can watch traffic over short or long periods of time.
Theoretical treatments also need to consider the computational power of the
attacker.
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Figure 1: Single-hop proxy
anonymizer.com www.slashdot.org
<html>
<a href="http://www.somesite.org">
Some site</a>
</html>
<html>
<a href="http://www.anonymizer.com/
http://www.somesite.org">
Some site</a>
</html>
www.slashdot.org (1) (2)
(4) (3)
3 Anonymizing services on the World-Wide Web
Single-hop proxy functionality. Most anonymizing services currently avail-
able to the general public at their base are merely single-hop proxies that make
the http request for the user. While using a single-hop proxy, the user sub-
mits the destination URL to the service and the service immediately issues an
http request to this URL. The http request appears to have originated not at
the user’s computer but at the proxy. As the target computer replies, sending
back an html document, the proxy sends back to the user this document with
all links rewritten so that they point back to the proxy, not to the sites they
originally pointed to. This means that when using, for example, the free part
of anonymizer.com, a link to http://slashdot.org gets rewritten, becoming
http://anon.free.anonymizer.com/http://slashdot.org.
The connection of the user to the proxy may or may not be encrypted.
Some services (see, for example, the-cloak.com) provide both; some (see, for
example, anonymizer.com) provide only unencrypted surfing for free and charge
for encrypted surfing.
Besides concealing the user’s IP and possibly encryption, extra functionality
of anonymizing single-hop proxies may include: filtering out or specially han-
dling cookies; filtering out or rewriting JavaScript, Java, or other active content;
filtering out advertisements and banners; proxying or blocking https; faking the
http user agent field in the http header (that is, not revealing information about
the user’s OS and browser); faking the http referer field (that is, not disclosing
the previously visited site).
Single-hop proxy examples. Table 1 lists a few available services. Note
that most such proxies aren’t run by businesses that have obligation to keep
them up, and therefore may appear and disappear unpredictably. Some of
these services (such as, for example, anonymizer.com) have been subject to
public review for a long time and have a reputation for not violating their users’
privacy. For others, caveat emptor may apply.
Single-hop proxy attacker model. A single-hop proxy attempts to pro-
tect the identity of the sender of a request from the attacker who can monitor
the traffic of the destination site.
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Name URL Encryption
Anonymizer http://www.anonymizer.com paid version only
the-Cloak http://www.the-cloak.com yes
ProxyWeb.net http://www.proxyweb.net paid version only
SnoopBlocker.com http://www.snoopblocker.com paid version only
Proxify.com http://proxify.com no
Anonymouse http://anonymouse.ws no
Web Warper http://webwarper.net no
Anonymization http://www.anonymization.net no
PurePrivacy http://www.pureprivacy.com no
Table 1: Some available single-hop proxies as of June 2003
What this really means is, that leaving aside bugs and faults in design or
implementation that may make such services able to disclose the information
they claim to conceal (an example is in [MS02]) and leaving aside their additional
content filtering capabilities, the main function of a single-hop proxy is the
concealment of the user’s IP from the site he accesses.
The destination site can do traffic analysis (see, for example, [SK02] or
[Ray01]) to learn about and from the user’s browsing patterns. The site can see
what paths the user takes inside it (communication pattern attack), the inter-
vals of time between requests (timing attack), the amount of transmitted data
(packet volume and counting attack), as discussed in [SK02]. The site may also
be able to correlate different accesses by the same user that occur at different
times (intersection attack).
Single-hop proxies also do not address the model of the attacker who may be
watching user’s traffic as it goes from the user to the proxy and from the proxy
to the user. Sometimes they do not encrypt such traffic, allowing any observer
on its path the full view of what is going on.
Even if the traffic from the user to the proxy and back is encrypted, the global
attacker that is able to watch both the user-proxy and the proxy-destination
sides of the proxy might be able to see what data the user requests and gets by
doing traffic analysis on the ingoing and outgoing traffic.
Going beyond a single-hop proxy. In 1981, Chaum introduced the con-
cept of “Mix-nets” (see [Cha81]). “Mix-nets” are groups of servers that provide
anonymity by passing user’s traffic through nodes called Mixes which may delay,
reorder, reencrypt, pad and forward traffic passing through them. In addition
to providing sender anonymity, Mix-nets attempt also to provide sender and
recipient unlinkability against a global attacker. Among the examples of Mix-
nets are Onion Routing [SGR97], Zero Knowledge Systems’ Freedom Network
[GS01], Web MIXes [BFK01], Tarzan [FM02].
Among the other approaches to the problem of anonymous web transactions
is the Crowds system [RR98], which allows participating nodes to forward re-
quests within their crowd with a certain probability. Crowds attempt to provide
sender and recipient anonymity, but unlike the Mix-nets, they do not attempt
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to provide sender and recipient unlinkability against a global attacker.
A problem: long-term intersection attacks. A subset of intersection
attacks and a major unsolved problem in anonymity systems are so-called “long-
term intersection attacks” (see [BL02]), where the attacker is able to watch all
or many nodes, including a number of entrance and exit points of the users
traffic. Users tend to have a certain behaviour while on-line. They tend to
send messages to same or similar destinations. If user A in a mix daily reads a
certain site, after very many observations it may be possible to match A with
the outgoing request to that site, using the knowledge of A’s presence or A’s
absence together with the information whether or not the site was visited during
that time.
One of the directions for dealing with this is dummy traffic (as discussed in
[BL02], [JVZ01]). Dummy traffic consists of messages sent even when the user
has nothing to send. A totally different approach is proposed in PipeNet [Dai98],
where the whole mix-net is supposed to shut down when one node stops to
communicate with the network.
4 Using caching for anonymity
We propose an anonymizing web-browsing system that would deal with the
global attacker who is able to do long-term observation. The proposal is to
make user requests to proxy independent in time from the proxy’s requests to
target sites. The proxy will request and cache information on its own and send it
to the users when requested. To do this, the proxy server would collect and store
documents which its users are likely to request; provide an encrypted channel
to access its contents; and rewrite links in the documents provided to the user
to point back at the proxy, similarly to the workings of an ordinary single-hop
proxy. This would mean that a global observer looking at the traffic to and from
the server will see only regularly scheduled cache updates and encrypted user
traffic, thus removing correlation between the users requests and the server’s
accesses to remote sites.
This caching proxy will act like a single-hop proxy, in that the destination
server does not find out who communicated with it except for the proxy. But
it does more than the single-hop proxy in many other respects: the destination
server does not find out that someone except the caching proxy communicated
with it at all, and neither does a third-party observer; the global attacker cannot
correlate requests from the sender and to the recipient; and long-term intersec-
tion attacks are meaningless since there is no connection between the proxy’s
fetches and the user’s requests.
In short, the attacker model includes not only the attacker at the destination
site (as that of existing single-hop proxies) but also the global attacker who is
able to do not only short-term, but also long-term attacks.
Similarly to the existing single-hop proxies, the user will not be protected
from the attacker at the proxy itself.
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Sender
anonymity
from
Recipient
anonymity
from
Sender,
recipient
unlinka-
bility
Single
point of
failure
recipient 3rd party sender 3rd party
Single-hop
proxies
yes no no no no yes
Mix-nets yes yes no yes short-term no
Crowds yes yes no yes no no
Unencrypted
caching1
yes no no no no yes
Encrypted
caching1
yes yes no yes yes yes
Table 2: Anonymizing systems compared
5 Candidates for a prototype
Caching proxies that periodically update their content. The best known
example of a caching proxy that collects data on its own for future use is Google’s
cache [Goo]. Every few weeks it crawls all the web, collecting, storing and
indexing text information from every webpage [BP98]. Attempting to scale to
the size of the whole World Wide Web, it has been optimized for memory usage
and speed.
Google’s primary objective is indexing text information. It does make the
attempt to index images but only caches thumbnail images, relying on the orig-
inal image being still present on the server. Such usage may be due also to data
size considerations, but there are also legal reasons for it. In a recent case, the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it is legal for search engines to
cache thumbnail images [Ols03a], but it is yet to be determined whether it is
legal to cache a full-size image copy. According to the Court, the use of thumb-
nail images is fair use, because they ’do not supplant the need for originals’
and ’benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the
Internet’.
Other search engines that allow access to their caches are Comet Web Search
[Com] and Gigablast [Gig]. An interesting web cache is Wayback Machine [Way].
This is an internet archive that contains multiple copies of webpages from 1997
to 2002. Similarly to the caches of search engines, it cannot be used for anony-
mous browsing. Using JavaScript, Wayback Machine handles links to point back
to the cache where archived versions are available, but if that fails, it sends the
request to the original site.
“Using Google cache as anonymous surf”. The idea of using Google
cache for anonymity has occurred to Google’s users before, but Google’s design is
not targetted towards this goal. Written apparently as a result of such attempts,
an FAQ entitled ’Don’t Use the Google Cache as Anonymous Surf’, [The03]
explains that clicking on a link in a cached page would lead you to a page
outside Google cache, an embedded image would attempt to load directly from
1Proposed for providing anonymity in this paper.
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rewriter.cgi www.google.com
<html>
<a href="http://www.somesite.org">   
Some site</a>
</html>
<html>
<a href="rewriter.cgi?
q=http://www.somesite.org">   
Some site</a>
</html>
www.slashdot.org (1)
(2)(4) (3)
search?q=cache:www.slashdot.org
Figure 2: Anonymizing caching proxy
the original site, and redirection might make the whole page load from the
original site.
6 Prototype
We prototyped2 an anonymizing caching proxy that outsources all caching to
Google by forwarding all requests to Google cache and rewriting links in the
resulting documents. When a URL is submitted to the script, the script requests
a cached copy from the Google cache. Any link in the document gets rewritten
to submit the link to this script, instead of going directly to the requested page.
Thus, if we deal with plain text data, every request would be redirected to the
Google cache.
The implementation has to detect all outward going links, detect their data
type and to rewrite them according to whether their content may be available
from Google cache.
Since Google cache does not store images, images are not provided unless the
user explicitly specifies that he wants the script to act like a single-hop proxy
that fetches them for him from the destination server. Such a transaction would
disclose the user’s browsing to the global observer. If the script is located at the
user’s machine, it would also disclose his IP to the destination site, while if the
script is not located at the user’s machine, this behaviour would be no different
from that of a single-hop proxy.
7 The caching proxy controversy
It appears to be an unfortunate law of the modern civilization that whenever
anyone wants to give out something for free, someone else is going to have a
problem with it. Caching proxies are no exception to this rule.
2The prototype is at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~ashubina/google.html. It is a CGI
script that can be located at the user’s machine or elsewhere.
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Figure 3: Current www.eff.org
Figure 4: Surfing www.eff.org in Google cache (images replaced by the
leaf logo of Dartmouth College)
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Most Web sites strive for high search engine rankings (on how to play this
game, see, for example, [CD03]). However, as described in a recent news.com
article [Ols03b], many of them are unhappy with caching of their contents.
[Ols03b] gives the following list of complaints about search engine caching:
• Caching of removed data. Caching lets users access pages that are
temporarily unavailable. Thus it sometimes provides also access to content
that has been deliberately taken off-line.
• Access to registration-only sites. Due to faults in the design of a
number of sites that require registration, caching may end up indexing
and caching their content.
• Detouring traffic from the original sites. The very feature that we
propose to use for anonymity is a subject of such complaints. The claim
is that by detouring traffic from the sites where the original information
is stored, caching may make Web publishers lose their income.
Interestingly, for the current implementations of all the web caches we re-
viewed ([Goo], [Way], [Com], [Gig]), the last claim is not quite valid. Among the
many ways in which the user’s anonymity from the original site provided by the
use of such caches is violated are images, which usually include also ads. Since
ads are not cached, a cached copy of a webpage with an ad usually displays
the ad downloaded from its original provider. Such ads may, however, not be
able to track to which site they really owe this request very well, and thus may
mistake the web cache for the referrer. (However, the proxy we propose has a
different behaviour.)
Google’s response to the last complaint is that web sites can easily prevent
Google from caching their pages without preventing it from indexing them. All it
takes is adding to your page either <META NAME="ROBOTS" CONTENT="NOARCHIVE">
to exclude all robots, or <META NAME="GOOGLEBOT" CONTENT="NOARCHIVE"> to
exclude just Google. However, some sites are reluctant to do this for fear that
this may affect their search rankings.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has a narrow exception for Web
caching, allowing internet service providers to keep local copies of Web pages.
It is not clear, however, whether this would protect also search engine caches or
archives similar to [Way] if tested.
The legality of a caching proxy such as we propose under the modern copy-
right laws is yet to be determined, as is the legality of search engine caches.
Due to the very features that make our scheme provide anonymity that are not
there for other web caches, our scheme may not be ruled legal even if other web
caches are.
8 Extensions
Obviously, a proxy such as we propose would not allow the users to use any
dynamic content. A user could not provide any information to be passed to the
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destination site without informing the destination site and the global observer
that someone is using the proxy to look at the destination site. It might be
possible to design a proxy that submits such a request for the user together
with other people’s requests or a number of randomly generated requests, but
such an extension is bound to be subject to attacks.
However, a natural extension would be allowing to search Google cache, using
Google itself and rewriting the results to point back into the cache. It might
also be possible to design a caching proxy that provides thumbnail images, as
does Google.
Google (as well as the other caching proxies described above) does not pro-
vide encryption, hence the information going to and from Google is not en-
crypted. An encrypted proxy would allow protection from an attacker that can
watch traffic going to it. Against such an attacker, it would also help to bundle
packets together or break them up, normalizing their size. Such a proxy could
also attempt to conceal its operations from an attacker at the very proxy by
means of private information retrieval.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an approach that would allow retrieving text infor-
mation from the web with better anonymity than a single-hop proxy allows to
achieve and would also eliminate long-term correlation attacks by the global
attacker. The approach uses a caching proxy that contains its own copy of the
World Wide Web (or of its large subset). One example of such a proxy is Google
cache, which we used for a prototype.
Our prototype is already useful both for achieving limited anonymity, and
for accessing cached copies of sites that for some reason are unaccessible at the
moment.
As privacy of web transactions becomes more and more important and harder
and harder to achieve, it may be worthwhile to use caching proxies to achieve
anonymous access to what may be the most important achievement of the human
civilization - written text information.
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